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THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
A. NORRIS HAS STANDING 
The State contends that Norris has no standing to challenge the "anything of 
value" language in the communications fraud statute,1 because his scheme was designed 
to obtain money, as reflected by his plea affidavit indicating, in relevant part: 
... The communications supporting the two counts are (1) the newspaper 
advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person meeting with 
the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice 
Section 76-10-1801 provides: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
or artifice is guilty of... 
devised to defraud the victims was to foil their ability to comply with 
contract agreements and then sue and obtain judgments against them. 
State's brief at 23-24, quoting R. 1822. 
Judgments are not money, but are things of value that may eventually be converted 
to money or property, depending on the assets of the judgment debtor. See, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. §78-22-1. 
Norris has additional standing because virtually all of the informations filed 
against him charged him with the "anything of value" language, and because the State's 
theory at the preliminary hearing apparently encompassed some counts involving his 
defrauding the victims of their time and labor. See Norris' opening brief on certiorari at 
23-25 (further discussing his standing). 
Under the terms of the informations and plea form, Norris was charged, pled 
guilty, and was convicted and sentenced under the "anything of value" language and has 
standing to challenge that statutory language. See, e ^ , Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 
2004 UT 14, ^  9-18 (to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, a 
defendant must show that his injury will be redressed by the court's addressing the 
statute; defendants may not challenge statutes which do not apply to their conduct). 
B. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE A 
KNOWING FALSEHOOD OR RECKLESS DISREGARD MENS REA. 
In seeking to refute the overbreadth challenge to the communications fraud statute, 
the State relies heavily on subsection (7), and argues that because this subsection always 
2 
requires proof of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard, the statute is insulated from an 
overbreadth challenge. State's brief at 17-21. The first Norris decision, upon which the 
court of appeals relied in this case, hinges on this same reasoning. See State v. Norris, 
2004 UTApp 267,U 11. 
Subsection (7) provides: 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were 
made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. 
By reviewing the portions of the statute defining the actus reus of communications 
fraud, this Court can readily determine that the mens rea reflected in subsection (7) is not 
a necessary element of any communications fraud offense, because subsection (7) 
requires proof of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in conjunction 
with the making of pretenses, representations, promises, or with material omissions. See 
M. 
Material omissions or the making of pretenses, representations, or promises, 
however, is not an actus reus and is not a necessary element of the offense of 
communications fraud; devising a scheme or artifice, and communication in furtherance 
of the scheme or artifice, are. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 states, in relevant part: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
3 
or artifice is guilty of: 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken 
and written communication. 
Because the State may well prosecute and convict someone for devising a scheme 
or artifice and communicating in furtherance of the scheme or artifice under subsections 
(1), (5) and (6), and is not required to prove that the person actually made false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or omitted something material, the mens 
rea required by subsection (7) does not necessarily apply in every communications fraud 
case. 
For instance, in Norris' case, the State never identified in a probable cause 
statement or through a bill of particulars or in any other fashion what specific 
communications formed the bases of Norris' charges. It could be that his charges rest on 
communications he had with people, which communications furthered his scheme, but 
involved no falsehoods whatsoever, such as phone conversations setting up the date and 
time for job interviews. 
According to the plea form, the two counts to which he pled were based on two 
communications: 
4 
(1) the newspaper advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-
person meeting with the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of 
agreements. 
(R. 1822). Employers are normally not bound to hire everyone in accordance with the 
terms of employment ads. They sometimes hire people to fill jobs other than those 
advertised, and often tailor the terms of employment to suit the people they do hire. 
Several of the preliminary hearing witnesses referred to meeting with Norris, without 
alleging any specific falsehoods at the meetings. See pages 23 through 25 of Norris' 
opening brief on certiorari, summarizing the preliminary hearing. 
Because the knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth mens rea is not 
essential to communications fraud prosecutions, this Court should reject the State's claim 
that subsection (7) insulates the communications fraud statute from overbreadth 
challenges. 
The State's argument that statements made with the knowing falsehood or reckless 
disregard for the truth mens rea are constitutionally unprotected is premised on Garrison 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), a case which is expressly directed at the context of 
criminal libel of public officials. See id- at 72-73 and n.8. In Garrison, the Court struck a 
criminal libel statute which imposed criminal liability for true statements made with ill 
will, and for statements made without regard for whether they were made with knowing 
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 71-75 and 77-78. 
In Garrison, id. at 74-75, and repeatedly since Garrison was published, the Court 
5 
has recognized that "'the First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters.'" BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 
516, 531 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42). 
Garrison permits criminal prosecutions for criminal libel to address the harm 
caused by that conduct. See id. at 75 (explaining that knowing falsehoods may effectively 
undermine the democratic political process). This is consistent with fundamental 
constitutional standards requiring laws impinging on First Amendment and related state 
constitutional interests to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 
See ,e^ , State in re N.R.. 967 P.2d 95 h 954 (Utah App. 1998). See also Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union. 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (a law that "effectively 
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and 
to address to one another ... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at 
least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to 
serve."). 
In contrast, under the State's interpretation of the communications fraud statute, 
the Utah communications fraud statute applies to a virtually limitless array of harmless 
conduct as long as it involves knowing or reckless dishonesty. See State's brief at 21-23. 
Thus, the Utah statute serves no compelling government interest, and is not narrowly 
tailored to serve any such interest. Particularly because the statute is a criminal statute, it 
cannot survive the appropriate heightened level of judicial scrutiny. See " I.M.L. v. 
6 
Si, te, 2002 IIT 110 at t l \ hi V h\ 1038 (criminal statutes are reviewed for overbreadth 
with heightened scrutiny). 
of schemes or artifices and communications in furtherance ol schem* ^ arufu-i > 
does not require the making of statements with ki lowing falsehood or reckless disregard 
for the truth, compare subsection ^  • • o ) and (6) with subsection (7) of § 76-10-1801, 
(mimon doe s it lot suppoi t. bi it l:i ltionalit} of tl ic: 
statute. 
C. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
u • ^ i i j i i . /..,.v.!i is controller h\ ;;=, 
authorities recognizing that when criminal fraiu? " =* cs impii ige oi :i I It st A i i iei iiii i iei it 
activities, they must be drawn with "narrow specificity" so that constitutionally-protected 
speech is not u m k u oi punished criminally as a byproduct of or direct application of an 
>i-i. \ nuitzc ui ^cnauinnerg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980);2 Sccrctan of Stale of Man iaitu .. JUMJ.;. ii. A-UUIMHI 
in Village of Schauinberg. the Court MRKK on iiivi ana i ouneemu . \..i^-j,vl— -.*. 
grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions ii 
those organizations used less than 75% of lhe donations for anything but the charitable 
purpose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary 
to protect the public from "fraud, crime and annoyance," and the Court agreed that these 
TTT:V valid interests. See, id. at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable 
Oi^diii/ations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid purposes other than 
(Wrcd Ji»n;»tinns in ihiMi- iiii*niip.*ii i-iwu-iiM-.1.- MIU::- »he Court found that the Constiti ition 
7 
Co.. 467 U.S. 947, 961-62, 965-68 (1984);3 Rilev v. National Federation of the Blind of 
North Carolina. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).4 
The State neither addresses nor refutes these controlling authorities. See State's 
brief at 1-40. 
In its argument, the State concedes that all types of political, commercial and 
interpersonal speech are subject to prosecution, provided that they involve falsehoods 
made with the knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth mens rea, which the 
State maintains is constitutionally unprotected speech. See State's brief at 21-23. Under 
the State's argument, political satire, political speeches, commercial puffing, religious 
speech, and interpersonal communications are all subject to prosecution as second degree 
felonies, when they involve falsehoods uttered with the knowing falsehood or reckless 
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent, or to prohibit 
them from soliciting funds. Id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve 
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations, 
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v. 
Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
3In Munson, the Court recognized that in Schaumberg. the Court struck ordinance 
because there was no connection between fraud and much of the constitutionally 
protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, and then struck a similar law 
pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits" and thus, the statute 
unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech. 
4In Riley, the Court struck a statute similar to that in Schaumberg and Munson 
after subjecting it to strict scrutiny and concluding that it was not narrowly tailored to the 
goals of fraud prevention and other related goals in charitable solicitations. 
8 
disregard for the truth mens rea. See State's brief at 21-23. 
As discussed above, communications may be prosecuted under the plain terms of 
the I Itah communica • 
i * • • ••: imunications which might be prosecuted under the Utah statute, 
such as commentary on the functioning of the government/ political debate,6 religious 
speech,7 and all manner of interpersonal communications.8 
. i. : . .. crNvadih and vagueness of the statute and the consequential danger that 
it can be used to both censor and persecute those with views failing to comport with those 
5When government leaders seek to justify a war in with lahe allegations of 
weapons of mass destruction, is this a second degree felony? See. e^g.. Village of 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First 
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation 
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."). 
A'hen a political candidate falsely promises that she will not raise taxes io garner 
votes, is this a second degree felony? See, e,g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620. 632 (1980) (First Amendment protects 
"communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, 
and the advocacy of causes.** > 
7When a religious leader falsely promises eternal glory to those who will do his 
bidding in a holy war, is this a second degree felony? See, e^g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 269 (1980 Oelicious speech and worship protected speech imdor F'INI 
Amendment) 
8If a woman falsely pledges to love a man forever in exchange for physical 
affection, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First Amendment protection of private speech and conduct 
between consenting adiills) 
9 
of the political majority, or with the police officer, prosecutor, judge or jury involved in 
each specific case. See, e.g., Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (recognizing that 
a "censor's power to exercise unbridled discretion under an overbroad statute" inherently 
deters First Amendment activity); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) 
(discussing the role of the vagueness doctrine in preventing discriminatory enforcement 
of laws).9 
Because the communications fraud statute plainly proscribes communications 
made in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to obtain something of value, without 
requiring proof of intent to defraud - communications which are plainly not fraudulent,10 
the communications fraud statute is not drawn with narrow specificity. 
Accordingly, this Court should apply the controlling authorities such as Village of 
Shaumberg, Munson and Riley, supra, and strike the communications fraud statute for 
constitutional overbreadth. See id. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION 
OVER THE CASE WHICH WAS FILED WHEN BETWEEN 
THE PREMATURE ISSUANCE AND RECALL OF THE REMITTITUR. 
9Counsel for Norris does not read this Court's order granting certiorari as seeking 
briefing on vagueness, but will provide briefing on that issue if so ordered. 
10See LaFave, Criminal Law, Chapter 8, § 90 (discussing fraud and other crimes 
falling under the rubric of false pretenses, which normally have the following elements: 
"(1) a false representation of a material present or past fact; (2) which causes the victim; 
(3) to pass title to (4) his property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation 
to be false and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim."). 
10 
\ I I II l •( )NCURRENT JURISDICTION ARGUMENT IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
I I IIS ( i)! :RT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI. 
In his opening bnu *-ii eemoran. Norn, contend, Hun me successixc tiling i-. n-. 
and subsequent recall of the remittitur), while the misdemeanor case was on appeal, and 
i, < • 1 lile a motion to dismiss with prejudice was pending before Judge Dever in case number 
9 71005698, \ iolated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrim.. . v; , n> opening brief on 
certiorari at 28 29. ' ' 
The State contends that this Court should not reach Norris's argument that the 
"' ""'IVmcous prosecution of him in multiple circuit and district courts violated the 
v.\ ;.... „ . : X ^ . J . ,;K argument . a , . J I I I ..v. u\. .u issue 
Whether the district court had jurisdiction o\cr felon} charges 
filed after remittitur in the related misdemeanor case but before the 
remittitur was recalled 
The second issue shall not be deemed to include the allegations 
- KI ., to due process, prosecutorial vindictiveness, or any other matter set 
- the third question presented by the petition, 
State's brief at 38, quoting order dated April 19, 2005. 
Because the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine goes directly to the jurisdiction of 
Judge Reese aftc i tt le i c n rittiti n and I: efoi e • I e c a l l • : J: th s i e I I littiti in in tl ic: n lisden leai lor 
case^ a|1(j j s e s s e n t i a i to a thorough legal analysis of the )\ irisdictional issi le it appears that 
the concurrent jurisdiction argument is fairly included in the Court's question and should 
11 
be addressed by this Court. 
In the event counsel for Norris misread this Court's order, she apologizes. 
B. THE CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS COULD NOT HAVE EXERCISED 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION. 
The State contends that Circuit Judge Watson had jurisdiction over the four 
original class A misdemeanor charges, State's brief at 28 n.7, and that the district court 
had independent simultaneous jurisdiction over the felony charges arising from the same 
facts, regardless of the appeal from the circuit court's dismissal order, State's brief at 27. 
The State argues that Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Footnills Water 
Company, 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), is thus rendered inapposite. State's 
brief at 27. 
Circuit Judge Watson dismissed the case on the theory that the aggregated 
damages of the four counts involving $300 each elevated the charges to $1,200 felonies, 
perhaps assuming that there was one scheme or artifice involved (R. 32, 36-67, 290, 624-
27, 682-84, 698). See State v. Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298, 99 P.3d 359 ("subsection 
(2) permits aggregation of the total value of money "obtained ... by the scheme or artifice 
described in Subsection (l),"Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(2) (2003), while subsection 
(5) permits "[e]ach separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)" to be treated as separate 
offenses."). 
Regardless of whether Circuit Judge Watson was in error in dismissing the case, 
12 
the district court judges Reese and Dever did not have independent and simulinr,.. .^ s 
jurisdiction over the subsequent two cases involving felony charges arising out of the 
sainc l;n I1 \' i' ,il un Mil 11 • inll case was on appeal. Particularly where the 
classification of each offense was ar ;. • • •, auuicLaic 
damages on the assumption that there was one all encompassing scheme (R. 32. \h-iV7„ 
. •". >. 4 . . < -i tv;<x}. j |Ki particulnrly where the misdemeanor and felony 
^ u- . .. :».. /olicereport j \ . v ^ ,^ ( ) 218-223), the 
charges should all have been brought together befo< ^ 
entity, and could not have been pursued simultaneously in the circuit court and district 
^ee e.g., , i.u, i IK;, win. V "76-1-402(2) (multiple offenses within the jurisdiction 
oJ one ( oi i ii hiii'u in i iiiiiii, |i(ii,iMnii un ni MK; lime
 {t{ uic arraignment, should be tried 
together); UtahR. Crim. P. 9.5 (all offenses arising oul ul ;i sniHr 1:11111111,11 episode 
should be prosecuted before one court by one prosecutorial entity). Compare, e.g.. State 
s .\icau. . tali 2UU1) (murder and conspiracy charges were properly 
, t .P -v- .n*.d • • s '• •• -' . • ; nets \inderlying the charges occurred 
weeks apart because they involved the same tun ; '; ^ * 
one single criminal episode, and properly joined under 9.5 and 76-1-402). 
MUK -» nypomesi,. iU ui MI IU courts may have maintained the 
prosecut * !;'- • • • > -,T'S semantic case number 971995598
 w a s 
pending a motion to dismiss with prejudice, and \\\\\\\ Ihr riiKiKiiiniiinr easi: \us I-
Li 
appeal. In the event that the misdemeanor appeal had resulted in reinstatement of the 
misdemeanor prosecution, the State's theory would have permitted at least two separate 
simultaneous or successive criminal prosecutions of the very same acts (albeit the refiled 
felony case involved more counts) in the district court (because the circuit court was 
phased out while the appeal was pending and before the first refiling1 ]). This would have 
violated § 76-1-402(2), Rule 9.5 and the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. See id- and 
Escalante v. Kent, 7 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1932) ("Where two actions between the same 
parties, on the same subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts 
having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being 
adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose 
of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with 
its action. This rule rests upon comity and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the 
execution of judgments by independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other 
rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual collision and be productive of most calamitous 
results.") (citations omitted). 
While the State contends that constitutional concerns are obviated by the fact that 
the district court case was stayed by Judge Reese pending the misdemeanor appeal, 
State's brief at 25, the State cites no authority to support the proposition. 
uThe circuit court case load transferred to the district courts as of July 1, 1996 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-2(1). The case was first refilled on September 30, 1996 (R. 
49-53, 128, 165, 176-180). 
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The muliiple prosecutions contemplated 971005698 by the State's llicor ; 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
Con-' ; * I • : institution, Amendment V, and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-W>i2)(ai piovide multiple I t\c< 
As the Court recognized in Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 L , >. *,/o i\3d ',u75 in discussing the 
icuc:*.. lA/ii; »v .vu,.„.v.; Clause, 
I l jhc Douivic- jv.upui Jy ClauM :ets against (1) a second 
prosecution for the same offense alter acquittal, (2) a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
These protections effectively bar the state from "mounting successive 
prosecutions" and wearing down the defendant," 'thereby subjecting him to 
i mharrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to !i\ L- in a 
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.'" They are 
also primarily intended "to prevent a defendant from bcin? subjected to 
multiple punishments for the same offense." 
Id, at K 27 (citations omitted). 
M.:.J s argument thu* >; was permissible to file the case in district court 
becau :j .* - • . . lple instances 
wherein Mr. Norris was arrested and jailed when the uhr • • 
increases in bail, sec. e.iz.. R. 189-199. 
/ \ss ! . • jeopardy did i lot eventually attach in both cases, the State's 
proposed sikv; nili.'iiirnii'. fiiuM't/niinii1, iioiiii iheless v. oukl \ lolatc due process 
of law. See, United States v. American Honda NUUQI. » oinpai, . 
13 
111. 1967) (due process forbids the government to harass citizens with successive or 
simultaneous prosecutions); PHE Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 743 F.Supp. 
15 (D.D.C. 1990) (same); Freedburg v. United States Department of Justice, 703 F.Supp. 
107, 110 (D.D.C. 1988) (same). 
Therefore, this Court should reject the State's suggestion that it would have been 
proper for the district court to permit simultaneous felony prosecutions before Judges 
Reese and Dever based on the same facts as were involved in the misdemeanors involved 
in the appeal while the appeal was pending, and should reiterate the general rule of Hi-
Country - that trial courts may not act on cases which are pending on appeal, for such a 
practice would waste judicial resources and transform cases into moving targets. See id, 
942 P.2d at 306-07. 
The State claims that Judge Reese properly stayed his case pending completion of 
the misdemeanor appeal under Nielson v. Schiller, 66 P.2d 365 (Utah 1937). State's brief 
at 26. 
In Nielson, this Court did impose a stay of one court s proceedings, which 
proceedings purported to restrain the parties from proceeding in a different court which 
originally had the case in related proceedings. Id. at 368. While the Court stayed the 
general proceedings in the second trial court, the Court vacated and set aside the orders 
issued by the second court, because it had no business usurping the power of the original 
court with concurrent jurisdiction. Id. Nielson stands for the propositions that when one 
16 
court has exercised jurisdiction in a case, a second court i v s d 
court does so act. the orders of that court are to be vacated and set aside. Id. at 368. 
.!. Kion>. signed by Magi: >l rate/Judge Reese, while the West 
Valley case was on apnea' vl -; ' annilicr Irlmn M IIIUMIHI Sn I inh(»*)S was pending 
a motion to dismiss with prejudice before Judge Dever (e LL R. 10, 5^ • * • • • « ! d 
ana set aside. Nee IU. Accord Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 307 (voiding order which entered 
i III,I| ! mill i i i ii lie, iuiiii|iiiii issued prematurely while case was pending on appeal); 
Transworld Systems Inc. \ Kobi^on. * " : -•«;••.-.ngs 
conducted without jurisdiction are nullities and void). 
1 ,11ASE MANHAT 1 AN DOES NOT CONTROL. 
I In1 ii' I ill appeal „ niul Stale's reliance on Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal 
Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 lJ.3il Mi<>, lm lin pinpn .ilimi lh.il Ifm MMIII ml appeal! 
dismissal of the appeal was self-executing and permitted the State to refile fk j* : •• 
charges despite the premature issuance of remittitur is incorrect, because jurisdiction 
< • •• new case was f ik\i mike Chase Manhattan, 
where the remittitur issued properh hw.u 
recalled, in this case, the remittitur issued prematurely, and Norris moved to sta\ \ v 
doe... . :leyappca.. in the addendum. 
'- ' ' - . u s prosecutions i:. anu nabie under the 
fundamental precepts ofcrnmna : \ s c.a., Bcrnm. Amcnean Honda., iv. ,., ; ^ 
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76-1-402, supra. The existence of the continuing case on appeal and the parallel 
prosecution in the district court is untenable under Hi-Country, svpra. Chase Manhattan 
does not prevail over these fundamental precepts, because it is a civil case which did not 
involve the constitutional and parallel protections involved in the criminal context. If trial 
courts were to take action on what appear to be self-executing orders of appellate courts 
before the appellate courts are entirely finished with the cases, this would result in the 
waste of resources, conflicts and confusion that Hi-Country expressly seeks to avoid. 
Hi-Country controls over Chase Manhattan, because this case involved the 
premature issuance of the remittitur (R. 41),12 which never moved jurisdiction from the 
appellate courts, just as the premature issuance of the remittitur in Hi-Country failed to 
transfer jurisdiction to the trial court. See id. at 306-07. 
In contrast, in Chase Manhattan, the issuance of the remittitur was not premature, 
but temporarily transferred jurisdiction back to the trial court until the remittitur was 
recalled upon this Court's grant of certiorari. See Chase Manhattan, 2004 UT 9 at [^ 7 
("If, upon remittitur and the revesting of jurisdiction, the trial court failed to enter an 
order vacating the Horbach Judgment before this court granted certiorari—again depriving 
12The court of appeals' docket, in the addendum to this brief, shows the following: 
the court of appeals dismissed Norris' appeal on March 26, 1997; the court of appeals 
denied the petition for rehearing and motion to stay the remittitur on May 13, 1997; and 
the court of appeals remitted the case the same day on May 13, 1997. Under the version 
of Utah R. App. P. 36 in effect at that time, the court of appeals should not have issued 
the remittitur until the time for Norris to file a petition for certiorari had expired. See 
Chase Manhattan, 2005 UT \ 9. 
18 
the trial court of jurisdiction~the judgment remained in effect."). Accordingly, Hi-
Country controls, and the information signed and order entered in the trial court while 
jurisdiction of the case remained on appeal should be voided. See id., 942 P.2d at 307. 
Because the district court did not obtain proper jurisdiction over Mr. Norris, this 
Court should order his case dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision, and hold that the 
communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad and that the district court 
failed to obtain jurisdiction over this case. 
Respectfully submitted on August 1, 2005 
AttorneyJfor tyty. Norris 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant 
Attorney General Kris Leonard, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, on August 1, 2005. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah 76-1-402 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought b> the defendant. 
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud-Elements-Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, mone>, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other 
than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of properly, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
78-22-1, Duration of judgment—Judgment as a lien upon real property— Abstract of 
judgment—Small claims judgment not a lien—Appeal of judgment— Child support 
orders 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court unless 
previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law. 
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of 
judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, 
not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, 
located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be 
filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment 
entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims 
division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the 
civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3). 
(5)(a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the notice of 
appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount considered sufficient by the 
court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the judgment, together with 
ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal, the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in 
Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the court shall 
enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and granting the judgment 
creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original judgment. 
(6)(a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support may be enforced: 
(I) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; or 
(ii) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a tribunal. 
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order. 
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration. 
(7)(a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the 
state becomes a lien upon real property if: 
(I) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information identifying the 
judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded in the office of the 
county recorder; or 
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information statement of 
the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the office of 
the county recorder. 
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice court. 
(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the judgment 
debtor: 
(I) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7)(a)(I) or (ii) occurs; and 
(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the judgment is 
effective. 
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection (7)(a). 
(8)(a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the name of the 
judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county recorder as required in 
Section 17-21-6. 
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the appropriate 
tract index in the office of the county recorder. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5 
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging 
multiple offenses, which may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or 
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-
1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the 
highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated 
except by order of the court and for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or 
information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial 
entity shall prosecute the offenses. 
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